The European Parliament is starting to process the 2040 climate target proposal presented by the European Commission on 2 July. The far-right Patriots group, with little previous experience in handling big policy files, surprised everyone by taking control of the coordination of the 2040 file. Early discussions reveal a wide gap between the centre-left and the far-right, and with the centre-right EPP unable to decide with whom to cooperate. The 188-member EPP group – the largest in the Parliament – is deeply split. If it manages to agree on a climate policy stance, it will hold the key to deciding the Parliament’s position on the 2040 file.
Since the elections in May 2024, the climate policy majority coalition in the European Parliament – the centre-right EPP, the Social-Democrats (S&D, and the liberals (Renew) – has seen increasingly shaky. The core problem is that EPP is now much more split internally. The group talks primarily of the need to reduce the cost of climate action, and many members are seeking to form new alliances with the hard right rather than continuing the pro-climate coalition with the centre-left.
EPP’s climate spokesperson Peter Liese keeps reiterating the need to stand by the 2030 targets and measures agreed in 2023 (the ‘fitfor55’ package) while also stressing the need for more ‘flexibility’ for the upcoming 2040 target. Others, most notably the faction leader Manfred Weber, have been more vocal about the need to also reopen some existing files, such as the 2035 ban on new combustion engine cars.
Last autumn, Commission President von der Leyen, who herself belongs to the EPP political family, reached out to Italian PM Meloni to obtain support for a second term at the helm of the Commission. That brought Italy on board in the Council and helped secure some more votes in the European Parliament from the hard-right ECR group, in which Fratelli (Meloni’s party) is one of the main constituent groups.
This, as well as EPP’s subsequent contact with ECR and Patriots for Europe (a far-right group built around France’s National Rally and Hungary’s Fidesz), has greatly angered the Socialists, the Liberals and the Greens.
On 2 July, the European Commission presented its long-awaited proposal for a 2040 emission reduction target, very likely the most important climate policy file to be processed during the current policy cycle (2024-2029). A key element is the idea to allow for up to 3% of the emission abatement target to be achieved through the use of ‘flexibilities’ such as international climate credits. See more details in our take on the draft proposal. On 9 July, the Patriots unexpectedly won the right to coordinate the processing of the 2040 climate proposal, bringing the centre-left’s discontent to a new low.
On 16 July, the Patriots announced that Ondřej Knotek will be rapporteur for the 2040 target file, meaning he will steer the deliberative process within the European Parliament and then represent the institution in trilogue negotiations with the Council and the Commission. The Czech MEP from the right-populist ANO party has for several years warned that the EU’s climate policy is dividing Eastern and Western Europe.
In this situation, we take stock to look at possible ways to form a majority on a 2040 target in the European Parliament. As a reminder, in terms of format and procedure, the 2040 climate target is a change to Climate Law. As such, it will follow the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure, which requires dual processing in the European Parliament and among the member states in the Council. The former reaches a position through an absolute majority (a vote in plenary), the latter by a qualified majority. Then, the two lawmakers engage in trilogue negotiations to reach a final decision.
The European Parliament has its centre of gravity on the right-hand side of the political spectrum, with the EPP holding 26% of the seats. Typically labelled as centre-right, this group includes CDU/CSU members from Germany, PO members from Poland (the party of incumbent PM Donald Tusk) and Spain’s PP.
The Patriots of Europe (PfE) is the third-largest group, with 12% of the EP members, many of whom come from Le Pen’s National Rally and Orban’s Fidesz.
Next is ECR (11%), which hosts Italy’s Fratelli and PiS (Poland’s biggest opposition party). Finally, as the eighth and smallest group, with 4%, we find Europe of Sovereign Nations centred around Germany’s AfD.
The reasons for the right-wing MEPs’ failure to unite in a broad alliance are too complex to investigate fully in this article, but they include differences both in substance and form. While they mostly agree on reducing immigration, they diverge on support for Ukraine versus admiration for Putin. They disagree on what should be the powers of the European Union (as opposed to the member states), and, maybe most importantly, they differ greatly in the tone of their communication. While France’s NR and Italy’s Fratelli aim for respectability, other far-right parties do not shy away from racist or otherwise controversial statements.
On the centre-left side, we find the Social Democrats (S&D) as the second biggest group at 19%. Most of their MEPs hail from Italy, Spain, Germany and France. In fifth and sixth position, we find the Liberals (10%) and the Greens (7%), both of which saw a significant loss of seats in the 2024 elections.
The far-left (6%), like the far-right, has traditionally taken a role of opposition, preferring strong statements rather than engaging in compromise negotiations.
Table 1 shows the number of seats the political groups hold in the European Parliament and lists their main national contingents.
*Majority needed if all members are present. In most cases, one-third of the EP members is sufficient to form a decision-capable quorum. The absolute majority is equal to half plus one of the members present in the room.
The three-party-group coalition that produced most of the winning majorities in the previous parliament – the EPP, the S&D, and Renew – has 399 seats. In theory, that is more than enough since only 361 votes are required for an absolute majority in a full plenary session. In practice, however, the political groups are loose alliances with little tradition for using the party whip to impose voting discipline. Very often, some national contingents vote in line with local/national interests rather than the line of the European-level political group.
The figures below illustrate hypothetical attempts to muster a majority in the European Parliament, i.e. 361 votes if all members are present. Note that our pie charts aim to illustrate possible casting of votes rather than seats, to allow for various levels of defections.
Figure 1 illustrates a possible continuation of the previous Parliament’s grand centre alliance, with additional support from the Greens. In this scenario, we assume 90% of MEPs from EPP, S&D, and Renew to vote in favour of a strong 2040 target. That brings the tally to 359 votes, just short of a win. That changes to a strong majority when we add the Greens.
* 100% of Greens vote for a strong target, 90% of EPP, Renew and S&D. All other MEPs vote against.
Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical alliance between EPP, PfE, ECR, and ESN to soften the 90% reduction target for 2040 proposed by the European Commission, e.g. by allowing for a more generous use of international climate credits or other types of flexibility. In this scenario, we assume that 60% of EPP members and 100% of the hard/far-right members vote for a softer or more flexible target. The remaining 40% of EPP plus all other MEPs vote against.
For the EPP, this would translate into 113 votes in favour of weakening, 75 against. That means altogether 340 votes for, 380 against, meaning the proposal would be defeated. Most likely in such a scenario, EPP would be more evenly split, thereby increasing the opposition to a weak target.
** 60% of EPP, 100% of far-right vote for a softer target, all other MEPs vote against.
Figure 3 considers the possibility that the hard and far-right parties, with a few supporters from EPP, will attempt to reject the whole 2040 target. In this case, we assume only 10% of the EPP members will join the push for rejection. This scenario demonstrates how far a far-right front would be from reaching a majority.
*** 100% of far right, 10% of EPP vote to abolish target, all other MEPs vote against.
As shown in the hypothetical scenarios, the most likely way to reach a majority on the 2040 target is for the three centre-left-to-centre-right parties to come together. They might need to muster a few more votes, either by compromising in a more ambitious direction with the Greens or towards less ambition with the ECR.
This apparent conclusion begs the question of why the EPP is so reluctant to follow this avenue. The answer lies in the fact that many EPP members are genuinely worried about the costs climate policies will put on European industries and households. Plus, if a more cynical view is allowed, it probably reflects their fear of losing voters to the far-right. In either case, it seems likely that the EPP will not pursue a grand central coalition on the 2040 target before all other options are exhausted.
With the European Commission opening the door to flexibilities such as international climate credits and even mentioning the possibility that lawmakers might prefer a share higher than 3%, it seems likely that increasing the flexibility might be just what it takes to get the EPP onboard for a majority compromise.
This week’s committee meetings are the last before the European Parliament takes summer holidays throughout August. The environment and the industry/energy committees will both convene briefly on 4 September, followed by longer meetings on 22-23 September. Agendas are not yet available, but depending on rapporteurs’ and shadow rapporteurs’ progress with drafting texts, we might expect discussion on the 2040 target at least during the late September committee meetings.
Once a report is approved in the environment committee, which is in charge of the file, it will pass to the plenary. The Greens and the centre-left parties are keen to process the file quickly, but it remains to be seen what approach Patriots’ rapporteur Ondřej Knotek will choose. If he senses little support from EPP for diluting the target, he might instead opt for a delay/obstruct strategy. If so, we will likely see a new motion in plenary to expedite the file, which, if supported by EPP, will be carried.
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